Under the Baobab Tree

Challenging orthodoxy about current international politics, particularly, politics in Ghana and Africa.

Ghana’s Presidential race: Why Akuffo Addo is miles Ahead August 28, 2008

Filed under: Uncategorized — yeebo @ 12:07 pm

Ghan’s Presidential race: Why I fear Nana Akuffo Addo is Miles Ahead.

 

A recent research by an American firm, claims that the MP for Akim Abuakwa South, Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo-Addo, presidential candidate of the ruling New Patriotic Party (NPP) “has been tipped to win the December election.” A similar research by groups fronting for the Convention Peoples Party (CPP) also claims that the CPP will “overtake the NDC.”
 
 

 

In an election year, there will be many of such research and pools. But how can they be trusted? Without venturing, I will dare make many predictions. Recently, when I told a close friend that Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo-Addo will win the Presidential elections and succeed Agyekum Kufour, his response was immediate. “No, they (NPP) cannot win this time.”

“Why”, I asked sounding perplexed. His answer was to the point. “There is too much poverty”. He could have said more, but he did not. No one can argue against the fact that for the past eight years, poverty has been on the increase, while the North-South divide is getting  dangerously wide. Yes, there is too much poverty, but unlike my friend, how much of that can be attributed solely to the NPP and Kufour?

 

For more than 20 years, Rawlings ruled Ghana first under the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) and later under the NDC (National Democratic Congress) administrations. So if Ghana is poor, and Ghanaians cannot make ends meet – which is a fact, who should be held responsible? The Committee for Joint Action (CJA) will blame the NPP. Indeed, on some occasions, Rawlings has been seen to join CJA rallies, giving credence this antiquated lie.

 

For me, Rawlings, more than Kufour should be held responsible for the current poor state of our infrastructure and welfare services. Water shortages, load shedding, poor primary schools, child poverty, you name it. If it is a matter of apportioning blame, then he (Rawlings) should shoulder a greater proportion of this, after all, he was in charge for over 20 years. Why Ghanaian voters will punish Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo-Addo for something that is not his making beats my mind? But some people seem to think that this is what will happen. Ghanaian voters are quite sophisticated, and can distinguish political gerrymandering for truth, I think so.

 

 

Incumbency and Diaspora connections are also important factors in this selection. Undoubtedly, Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo-Addo will benefit from his government’s incumbency. While the NPP rules Ghana, Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo-Addo will have advantages which the other Presidential aspirants may not have. Other parties in Africa have always benefitted from incumbency, but Sierra Leone and Kenya demonstrates that sometimes, a party needs more than incumbency to win an election. But it is worth exploring.

 

Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo-Addo has been to Guinea, Nigeria, and will soon be on his way to other countries with huge Ghanaian Diaspora communities. Some of this can be attributed to the fact that the NPP is still in charge. But to be frank, the NPP has always had a huge Diaspora following in the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, the Netherlands and so on. The Diaspora has always been a source of funding for the NPP. The party will exploit these connections to raise huge amounts of money for the Akuffo Addo campaign.

 

The NDC has also benefitted from such Diaspora links, although limited to the personality of Rawlings. Rawlings could rely on a few Diaspora Ghanaians and African-Americans in the US because he built connections with the African-American community mainly through the Louis Farrakhan networks while he was in office. Recently, the CPP presidential candidate, Dr. Paa Kwesi Nduom, was in London on fundraising and meet the community tour. His address to party loyalists in north London was impressive, candid and courageous. He demonstrated that the CPP’s revival was not a figment of our imagination, and for party loyalists like me, it was encouraging.

 

The strength of the various parties contending for power is another. The NPP, NDC, CPP and PNC are the main parliamentary parties. Of all these parties, the NPP remains the one with huge potential to raise money – by any means necessary. The NDC has advantages which it has squandered and continues to squander due to huge personal egos and power hungry individuals who behave as though Ghana will sink without their meddling.

 

The continuing attention lavished on Rawlings – who is not a Presidential candidate is disadvantageous to the Professor John Evans Atta-Mills campaign. In my view, and it is one which I will hold with deep religious conviction, the main obstacle between Professor Mills and state power is neither Dr. Paa Kwesi Nduom nor Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo-Addo, but Rawlings.  It also appears that no one in the NDC has the courage and conviction to ask Rawlings to do the decent thing for the sake of the party. For Professor Mills to run a clean and honest campaign, Rawlings and the undemocratic tendency in the NDC must take a back seat and allow the Professor to represent their party (the  NDC).  Until then, the Professor has a huge battle.

 

How about the others? The CPP is beginning to show some revival under the leadership of Dr. Paa Kwesi Nduom.  Since he won the support of the CPP congress, Dr. Ndoum has taken up the challenge with confidence and zeal. Those of us who doubted his commitment to the Nkrumaist agenda will now have to revise our thoughts and support Dr. Ndoum. He appears to be a fighter, a man of unadulterated zeal and convictions. However, the CPP will need more than this for Dr. Ndoum to get the keys to the castle of Flag Staff House.  There are some who think Kwesi Nduom might even lead the CPP to victory. My projection is that the CPP will make serious parliamentary gains. Dr. Paa Kwesi Nduom might hold the cards if the Presidential race goes for a second run. Nevertheless, Kwesi Ndoum will take the party far beyond what others have done in the last two elections.

 

In assessing the chances of the parties and their candidates, it is becoming clear to me that the Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo-Addo campaign is perhaps the most professional, up to date and formidable machinery.  It is obvious that Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo-Addo is exploiting his skills as a human rights lawyer and campaigner to good use. The NPP is not known for its activism, but Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo-Addo is. This shows that there is a distinction between President Kufour and Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo-Addo.

 

He is pragmatic about regional and pan African politics, so far, he seems to be the only one articulating the ECOWAS agenda. He has already broken his party’s mould by talking about pan Africanism, while he was in Guinea (Conakry), even paying tribute to Osagyefo Dr. Kwame Nkrumah. Whether this is an opportunities election ploy or not, we wait to see. Basically, he is stealing the clothes of the CPP. That worries me as a CPP member because I have always regarded that terrain as a no go area for the NPP. The CPP will need to catch up. Paa Kwesi Ndoum also articulates a progressive regional and Pan African policy, supported by Kwame Nkrumah’s daughter.

 

On the economic front, I will need to check party manifestoes before passing judgement. My guess at this stage is that there will be little difference between them. The NPP will maintain its liberal economic philosophy, with greater emphasis on the market, and probably continue the NDC policy of selling the nations assets to the highest foreign bidder. It will do what the IMF and World Bank instructs it to do, although with more caution than Rawlings and his PNDC/NDC did with the help of Dr. Kwesi Botchway, and foreign predators.

 

Here, only the CPP has the blueprint for a national economic revival of the ailing neo-colonial economy. It is refreshing to listen to Dr. Paa Kwesi Ndoum honestly articulating a progressive economic policy based on self reliance. It seems the CPP will have some welfare type policies to appeal to its grassroots but the leadership is certainly not a socialist ideology wielding type. As for the NDC, the way the Rawlings regime handed Ghana’s economy to market forces, selling anything of value, and closing down schools and welfare centres, making civil servants unemployed and so point to the sort of recklessness which Ghanaian can do without. I do not think they are better at managing the neo-colonial economy than the NPP, probably worse. Neither the NDC nor NPP can match the CPP on this score.

 

I am worried at my own conclusions, for, if my predictions are right, Ghana will be ruled for another 4 years by the NPP, but this time with Nana Akuffo Addo as President. It will be crowning moment for the NPP, but sad for Nkrumaists like me since I would like to see the back of the NPP. Of course, I would like to see the CPP ruling Ghana again, but that is a forlorn hope, and might not happen. Something tells me that my wishes will not come through this time. I have to get used to another dose of NPP medicine. If this happens, the only real loser will be Professor Atta Mills, who would have lost his last chance of becoming President. But it is too early for such predictions, there will be several months of campaigning and mudslinging. Even my village bakologo (frafra word for soothsayer) is cautious on this. He is playing a waiting game, so am I?

 

 

Zaya Yeebo

 

Ghana at crossraods: Time for Change August 28, 2008

Filed under: Uncategorized — yeebo @ 12:06 pm

 Ghana at Criossroads: Time for change

 

For the first time in Ghana’s post independence history, the choice of a president remains a very tight race. For a start, there is an impressive array of presidential aspirants, most of whom, one can say with satisfaction, have the right credentials to run Ghana. That makes it a very tight race. But there is more to this election than most.

 

In 2000, the election was about whether the Rawlings founded NDC (National Democratic Congress) could be trusted to take Ghana forward without a major political and social conflict. It can be said with certainty that in 2000, there were many political interests in Ghana who thought that another NDC victory would spell a disaster for the country. Rawlings had been in power for almost twenty years in various guises.

 

While many Ghanaians can point to some positive things about this era, there is an equal number who can list lots of negatives about the period. Some of the actions of the NDC leadership at the time helped to smoulder open democracy, and fertilised the soil with bile and blood, out of which grew ineptitude, incompetence and tribal fanaticism of the worst kind. In spite of this, the local and foreign cheerleaders of the Rawlings (not the NDC), believed that their hero’s mission of destroying a buoyant democracy had not been accomplished, and that those who opposed him were a treacherous distraction. Ghanaians knew better, and President Kufour benefitted from this groundswell of anti-NDC hysteria.

 

The 2008 election is quite different. Form many this is perhaps the most important election which will define the future of Ghana. The discovery of oil is one factor. Oil is always a source of hope and fear. In some countries, it ahs made the politicians, and their foreign harbingers quite fabulously rich, while impoverishing the many, especially those on whose soil the oil is found. Mention oil, the mouths of politicians and business (both local and foreign – begin to salivate with murderous glee. To that extent, the major political parties – the NDC, the NPP (New Patriotic Party), the PNC (Peoples National Convention)  and the CPP (Convention Peoples Party) also have their eyes on the oil prize.

 

But there is a catch. While Ghana is being praised by many for being able to hold a stable country, there are worrying signs of fracture and destabilisation. There is a feeling that in spite of what the NPP might have achieved; there are worrying signs of national decay, some of which can be traced to the days of the NDC. Poverty is on the rise. When poverty reaches the levels that it has in Ghana, even the cleverest of political economists are hard put to know what to do. Chieftaincy related conflict is increasing daily, while cocaine promises to blight the country, as it is seen as a major transit point. What if Ghanaian youth become users of cocaine? Related to this is youth unemployment and lack of opportunities for upward progression. Corruption remains a serious issue, even though I would not go as afar as suggest that it is the cause of poverty and underdevelopment as some people like to exaggerate. These are issues which the next President has to address as a matter of urgency.    

 

What is crucial  is whether the next leader has  the right strategic approach and support from his own party to address these issues. The first President, Osagyefo Dr. Kwame Nkrumah had the undoubted commitment to address issues of development, poverty and change. But some would argue that he lacked the rights lieutenants to help him achieve his socialist goals. The NPP – both past and present, does not have such problems. There seems to be ideological unity of purpose, even though there may be disagreements in terms of strategy.  The CPP seems to be grappling with these in manner that is quite distasteful, and can only lead to paralysis. The constant desire to deny the party any ideological affinity is worrying one.

 

As for the NDC, it is caught up in contradictions of its birth. As  party, it has the signs of  strong leadership, but not a democratic one. It seems that having helped to found the party, Rawlings would like to treat the party as a personal fiefdom, sometimes, treating the party’s presidential candidate like a tiresome priest. Professor Mills is a man of honour. He has the credentials to lead the country, but his problems do not stem from Nana Akufo Addo’s (the NPP candidate) well oiled campaign machinery, but from his own party. Some ex-leaders have developed a ruthless delusional fanaticism of a man who is afraid of the dark, and has to be in the limelight  day and night. Any attempt to shove them to the back is met with the response of a wounded tiger.  That is Mills Achilles heel. If the NDC does not control the intemperate behaviour of its leader, it can send the party into a tailspin. If he (Mills) can overcome that, then his chances of gaining the keys to the new Presidential lodge would be hugely improved.

 

Come to the NPP. They have a presidential candidate with an impressive history of political activism No one can deny that Nana Akuffo Addo has a long history of campaigning for democracy in Ghana. But like the CPP, the NPP can also be expected to see cracks in the party because it has its own  contradictions. They may want to deny it, but the problems stems from the two traditions of the party. The Busia/Danquah fraternities, or to put it crudely, the Ashanti-Akim factions of the party. For the sake of unity, and capturing the prize, both tendencies will sacrifice personal interest for their leader, so this does not constitute a major problem yet. .

 

No one knows how the coming elections will play out. I think the CPP can only out for increased parliamentary seats, for me that will be enough. The real contest is between Professor Arthur Mills and Nana Akuffo Addo, the two titans. The parties should use the campaign period to highlight issues of national nature, explain how they intend to deal with intractable conflicts (e.g. Bawku), but most important of all, how they intend to address poverty from a radical and structural angle.

 

In the past, some of our leaders have failed to understand the challenges that confront them, or the consequences of their actions. Some have seemed incapable of responding with clarity when confronted with genuine injustices, giving the impression that they are complicit in the oppression of the majority of Ghanaians. 2008 presents us with a chances to change all that. Can we seize the moment?

 

(c) Zaya yeebo

August 200

 

Exile Movements and Democratic Change in Africa August 28, 2008

Filed under: Uncategorized — yeebo @ 12:05 pm

Exiles Movements and Democratic Change in Africa

 

What do African political activitis do in exile? This is a question i have been asked often. But the answer has always been long in coming. This time, i am trying to provide one.

 

Yusuf Hassan, a prominent Kenyan political activist in the 1980s, believes that by not discussing the role of exile movements in African, politics, we are leaving out a great part of the history f political struggles. He call this, the “missing chapter in the history of democratisation” in Africa. By this, he means that any examination of the recent history of Kenya, Ghana and Nigeria would reveal glaringly, how the exile opposition movements are denied their place in history. It is as if the exile movements did not play a central role in the return to constitutionalism and democracy. Yet the role of these groups in the democratisation process is far more remarkable than it is often recognised.

 

The political turmoil that engulfed some African states in the 1970s and early 1980s, invariably led to the flow of some major political groups towards western countries, principally, the UK, France, Germany, and the United States, among others. In the UK, the exile movement comprised major political groups and activists from Eritrea, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Tanzania, Cameroon, Uganda, the Gambia and Nigeria.  One common feature of these groups was their desire to continue the “struggle” for democracy back in their countries.

 

It has to be recognised that this was in the period of the cold war, and in no other continent was the cold war fought more bitterly than in Africa, where politics and society in general reflected the divisions created by the cold war. Politics in the 1970s and early 1980s reflected the international situation then. The flow of exiles is also symptomatic of the brain drain that has affected Africa for decades.

 

Countries which have experienced political instability and violence tend to have the greatest exodus of its professional and business classes. Ghana is a classic example of this phenomenon. Between 1966 and 1980, many professionals left Ghana to seek say or refugee status in other parts of the world. This exemplifies the political instability, economic chaos and general uncertainty of that period. Under the Rawlings regime, there was a deliberate attempt to drive out those who were most likely to oppose the regime or resist the political oppression and corruption of the era.

 

Ask any political exile and the answer you get is that they have no reason to leave for good. While in exile, he would campaign for political reform and democratic v change to create the environment for their return home. Getting exiles to return therefore requires significant political change as it happened in Ghana after the defeat of the National Democratic Congress regime. Historically, political exiles have played a significant role in democratic change in many Africa countries.

 

Two prominent leaders of Ghana, Dr. Kwame Nkrumah and the late Professor Abrefa Busia studied in the US and the United Kingdom, and were profoundly influenced by the debates about democracy from two differing political perspectives. Dr. Kwaem Nkrumah was influenced by the emerging pan African, and his association with other political exiles like RLC James influenced his radical thinking greatly. The late Dr. Kamuzu Banda lived in Ghana and was influennced by the emerging independence movement in Ghana, and later returned to campaign for the liberation of Malawi. In the same way, Zimbabwe’s  radical leader, Robert Mugabe studied in Ghana, where he met his wife and was influenced by  the ideas of Dr. Kwame Nkrumah.

 

While not describing themselves as “exiles”, they were nonetheless living outside the boundaries of the countries they sought to influence. This includes Jomo Kenyatta, Obafeimi Awolowo, Kwame Nkrumah, Kamuzu Banda, Kenneth Kaunda and Robert Mugabe. The leadership of the African National Congress of South Africa would qualify for this categorisation.

 

In the early 1980s, political exiles living in the United Kingdom, led by  the late Professor Mohammed Babu, played a leading role in mobilising Diaspora based African to campaign for the end of military dictatorships ad an end to one-party rule in Africa, and for a return to multi-party democracy. London in the 1980s was the bastion of anti-dictatorship struggles with almost every African country represented in the political circuits. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the repression initiated by  Mengisthu  and his Marxist Derg regime in Ethiopia in the 1980s drove hundreds of thousands of professionals, students, businessmen and women,  and generally every Ethiopian who has the means t lave did so. Some of these exiles who settled in London, the United States and other parts f the world,  helped to fund and organise the armed opposition that toppled Mengistu Haile Mariam in 1991.  Somali went through a similar phase spanning the time of Siad Barre to the time of his death and the breakout of the civil war.

 

In the 1980s, Ghanaian exile movements included the United Revolutionary Front, the Democratic Alliance of Ghana, the Ghana Democratic Movement, and several others. Most of these represented mainstream political parties like the Convention Peoples Party, and the Busia Danquah fraternity. The current leadership of he NP government includes prominent people who were then in exile. Honourable J. H. Mensah, General Hamidu, and several others top this list. Others like Major Boake Djan also played a leading role in mobilising exile movement for the restoration f democracy in Ghana.

 

Nowhere is the role of the exile movement more exemplified than South Africa under the white-minority apartheid regime. The fall of apartheid in South Africa was hugely influenced by the contribution of leading South African exiles from both the African national Congress (ANC) and the Pan African Congress (PAC). Leading exiles like Thabo Mbeki, now president, spent years in exile. Africans driven abroad by political repression, economic hardship and lack of academic freedom, often return to agitate for progressive political and social change. Exiles from Kenya, Ghana, Togo, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ivory Coast, Bukina Fasso, and many other countries have played and continue to play this role.

 

Since politics is a major cause of exile, political changes can also causes  many exiles to return home to take off from where they left. The end of the brutal Rawlings dictatorship brought many Ghanaian exiles and émigrés back home. The same situation applied in South Africa after the fall of the apartheid regime, the defeat of Daniel Arap Moi in Kenya in 2003, the fall of the Sani Abachi dictatorship in Nigeria. The end of apartheid brought South African exiles home in droves. 

 

The role of exile based organisations and intellectuals in moulding internal democratic processes are as old as history itself. History is replete with examples of exiled groups and intellectuals working to promote constitution making and democratisation processes. Academics and intellectuals who had lived in the Diaspora led the independence movement in Africa.

 

In some countries such as Rwanda, Uganda, Namibia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and the Sudan, former exiles have returned to play significant roles in their own countries. The list above would indicate a certain trend in this, i.e., where the internal opposition is armed, the role of the exile movement becomes central to their own post liberation role. However, in countries such as Nigeria, Kenya and Ghana, where opposition has mostly been peaceful the outcome has been different. It has not been so easy.

 

 

Exile movements in the Diaspora do not always have the same ideological or political orientation. It is also possible for one country to have several political groups divided mainly by ideology and sometimes ethnicity (e.g., Ghana and Nigeria). The congregation of these groups in the UK, mainly London, meant that networking became inevitable, especially, when some of these groups began to realise that the governments were exploiting their own internal divisions.

 

Another factor, which influenced these groups, was the international solidarity from various European groups and progressive individuals, especially in the UK. For example the Committee for the release of Political Prisoners in Kenya was  formed to campaign for the release of  Ngugi W’athiongo, and for greater freedom against what was then characterised as “the Arap Moi dictatorship”. This group campaigned against the Moi dictatorship and for the release of political prisoners in Kenya.

 

It is not an exaggeration to state that at some point, these groups became the only viable platforms for campaigning against one party dictatorships and for constitutional reform in some African countries. Kenya’s Mwakenya and the Nigerian democratic movement under the Abacha dictatorship are examples.   For example, in the 1980s, the Rawlings regime went through a period of severe political repression characterised by executions, detentions of opponents without trial, and general intimidation of the population. The only avenue to express dissent and to campaign for a return to democratic rule was through the opposition movements based in London, namely the left wing United Revolutionary Front (URF) and the right wing Campaign for Democracy in Ghana.

 

Ugandans, Cameroonians, Gambians, Sudanese, Ethiopians, etc. also did the same for their cause in London. These groups published propaganda materials, contributed cash and in some few cases, arm to their groups at home. They also linked up with human rights groups in Europe such as Africa Watch, the Africa Research & Information Bureau (ARIB), Amnesty International to campaign for the release of political prisoners.

 

Undoubtedly, the activities of these organisations and individuals contributed greatly to changing perceptions about the nature of these regimes and bolstered the activities of opposition groups in the home country.  The talk of the second liberation, third revolution, which would sweep away one-party dictatorships and their military counterparts, were born of this exile revolution.

 

It is this aspect of African history, and contribution to democracy that has yet to be debated, documented and studied. The exile movement remains in the UK, but its relevance is waning as most African governments take the constitutional road to democracy. This project seeks to discuss the role of exile movements in the democratisation process, and provide an avenue to examine the continuing role of these movements in the democratisation process.

 

While exile groups may contribute to Constitutionalism and the democratic process, they may also present some moral dilemmas. There is always a political contestation between exile groups based in the Diaspora and internal opposition groups. The main question for this being whether these groups really represent the national interest  (different contestations of the national interests based on class, ideology and the programme of a political movement).

 

The Centre for Community Development Initiative’s “Exiles and Democratisation” Project has been looking at the role of these movements in African politics. Funded by the Ford Foundation (www.fodrfoundation.org), the project works with exile based political groups and individuals to examine in detail, the role that these movements have played and continued to play in African politics. The report of a worskop orgnaised in 2006, is entitled, “Telling Our Own Stories – African Activitis in Exile”. This book fills a missing chapter in Africa’s quest for genuine democratic rule based on Constitutionalism and democratic reform, and for a beter understnading of the role of Africans in exile.

 

 

© Zaya Yeebo

April 2008

 

Promoting Parliamentary Democracy – the African Perspective August 26, 2008

Promoting popular democracy  through legislative strengthening in Africa- a new approach required



 

This paper looks at ways in which African countries can build long term democratic institutions, while at the same time providing the wherewithal for institutions of democracy to become independent of vested interest and foreign influences.

 

Introduction

 

The second liberation of Africa occasioned by passionate street protests against one party and military rule, in the late 1980s, early 1990s, which was preceded by years of popular struggles in Africa and opened the floodgates to multi party democracy. Today, democracy is taken for granted by many, while the clamour for this system of government has never been louder. While African governments, political parties, civil society, and various solidarity movements grapple with new approaches to building sustainable democracies, donors have increasingly been concerned mainly with the impact and quality of governance and their economic development aims in Africa. 

 

Increasingly however, it is becoming obvious to all that years of popular struggles by farmers, youth, women’s movements, and intellectuals and so on, will come to nothing unless the institutions of popular democracy are built and sustained to underpin the gains that these struggles yield. I use the term ‘popular democracy’ as opposed to other forms (e.g. electoral democracy) because in recent years, ‘democracy’ has been the subject of various debates. In my view, popular democracy is the sort of democracy that is won by the people’s movement for change. It can be gained through elections or violent means, as long as it is democratic, and is based on the consent of the people. Perhaps, the best definition of this, is Winston Churchill’s’ admonishing to UK parliamentarians that: “it is not Parliament that should rule; it is the people who should rule through Parliament” (House of Commons, November 11, 1947).

For any society that seeks to build and sustain democracy, three main institutions are essential: parliament, political parties and civil society (the media is included in civil society). In Africa, it is essential to add traditional institutions represented by chiefs and traditional rulers, and the mass of young people, and the women’s movements, community based organisations and so on. Any attempt to secure popular representative democracy without these important actors is bound to result in a system of government that is not accountable, non-democratic nor less representative.

 

Power, democracy and representation

Democracy, especially the popular version is about the acquisition of power and the means to distribute or redistribute abundant economic resources and power arrangements in a society, not simply about elections. Power is also about the distribution of resources and the means of acquisition. Every African country tries to balance power relationships vis-à-vis ethnic, regional, religious, and sometimes economic interests. Some may call this ‘tribalism’ or ethnicity, but real politic dictates these arrangements. A lack of awareness of the local political context, i.e., the real politics of a country therefore means that most foreign imposed solutions, no matter how well intentioned, is bound to fail.  

 

Traditional forms of donor support  to African parliaments relies overwhelmingly on ‘technical’ support, which most often is based on quick two-day workshops. In all the efforts by national governments, political parties and external donor institutions, the question of building long term democratic culture is often is eschewed in favour of short term, quick, and often non durable solutions. These workshops are usually facilitated by people whose experience of governance or parliamentary development is based on countries with long years of parliamentary tradition (e.g. House of Commons in the UK).  While these may be relevant at times, and could provide valuable lessons in parliamentary practices and systems, sometimes, they are off the mark.

 

Experience has taught me that these engagements are not aimed at institution building, but largely discussions on what ought to be, or what is done elsewhere in what is called “mature” democracies. The tools are often lacking. It is also important to recognise that political behaviour is usually not influenced by these workshops and conferences. They have their uses; but more often than not the issue of building sustainable institutions for democracy is even not on the agenda.

 

There is also an assumption that the key requirement to creating effective parliaments and political parties is having a democratic and accountable government. The reverse could also be true. Strong political parties can ensure effective representation in parliament, leading to people-based and accountable legislatures, and vice versa. A strong popular based democratic government will more or less be based on consent, i.e., the will of the people and could garner support in times of a political stalemate or crisis as we are seeing in Zimbabwe.

 

A people based legislature will be in a position to oversee resource re-distribution which is equitable and fair, and not influenced by regional or ethnic considerations, will defend the national interest and develop a economic and foreign policy based on old fashioned ‘national interest’. In today’s world, globalisation has become an excuse for naked exploitation. If parliaments are to retain their relevance and gain the respect of the people, they ought to show they have teeth and are willing to use the vast powers they have in protecting the vulnerable.

 

Western donors institutions are beginning to acknowledge the fact that  some forms of donor assistance in this area is greatly flawed and ineffective. They lack detail and focus; are naïve about the politics of these countries, their cultures and history; and are implemented by people who lack political judgement. In my years of working in governance from the UK, I have often met people in highly respected institutions who often treat Africa as if it were one region, and do not bother to study in depth the countries in which they work.

 

There is a reluctance to accept the fact that Parliaments are not value-free institutions. They are often the product of a long term process of political struggles, and therefore reflect the cultural and political traditions of a country and of particular societies. No one will argue that the US Congress and the UK House of Commons have different traditions and precepts. Why should that be a problem in the case of Africa? In essence therefore, the institutional or capacity needs of African parliaments are bound to differ, and rightly so. It is important to bear this in mind in developing strategies and programmes to underpin the work of legislative institutions in Africa. The differences matter. The capacity building needs of the Ethiopian House of Peoples Representatives (HoPR) and those of the Kenyan National Assembly are bound to differ. While Ethiopia has emerged from years of military dictatorship and a guerrilla war, Kenya is also emerging from years of one party rule, still trying to come to terms with a troubled transition.

 

Institution building versus parliamentary strengthening

 

In recognition of the increasing importance of parliaments and Members of Parliament (MPs) in democracy building, parliamentary strengthening has become an important part of international democracy assistance strategies.  As a representative forum, African parliaments remain one of the most important institutions of governance and democracy building. Historically, national parliaments have always performed the roles of representation, legislation and accountability. In their representative function, parliaments ensure that all shades of political, ethnic, and/or cultural views are represented and articulated to government. 

 

Parliament therefore serves as a crucial link between the electorate (voters) and MPs. As a legislative body, parliaments play a critical role in the legislative process by scrutinising and amending government bills, but also possess the ability to initiate, propose and shape legislative national priorities. Finally, parliament is the only constitutional way through which democratically elected governments are held to account in their actions and policies. To a large extent, parliaments help to establish the norms and values that underpin the democratic culture of a country and help to shape people’s expectations and attitudes towards democracy.

 

But one area that is constantly lagging behind people’s expectations is the relationship between the elected representative (the MP) and his/her constituents, and therefore their ability to hold governments to account. Every democracy requires a mechanism for constant national dialogue as a forum for peaceful coexistence. In countries in transition from conflict to peace (e.g. the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Somalia, or even Kenya), mediation and reconciliation remains a key function of the national parliament. Yet in many parts of Africa, national parliaments are falling short of these expectations.  For African parliaments, the reasons for such weakness are varied and differ from country to country. 

 

Investment in African parliaments has often been low, even though this is steadily rising in recognition of current realities. Yet, they still lack the basic tools to perform their core functions as representative institutions.  Most have limited staffing, and often poorly trained staff, lacking in experience and political will. The internal structures, often inherited from the colonial days, remain weak and disorganised, thus undermining the rules of parliamentary business. 

 

One area that is often ignored in African parliaments is the influence of the unique political environment. No parliament is independent of the political process or the interest of the ruling elite; indeed, parliaments often reflect the political realities of the day.  The effectiveness of a parliament will therefore be conditioned by the existing political realities in which they operate. One such reality is the process of transferring power, often seen as a quick fix, a change of guard at the State House, regardless of the long term consequences for the country in question. For those who prefer the quick fix solution of transition, any attempt to anticipate hiccups and difficulties are frowned upon, and when this happens, it comes as a surprise to them. Kenya is a good example of this.

 

It is also often the case that organisations involved in parliamentary strengthening are themselves lacking in experience and a track record of supporting African political institutions. There is often an assumption that foreign based international organisations or individuals have the wherewithal to provide parliamentary capacity building to enhance the effectiveness of legislative institutions. ‘Internationals’ as they are called these days are therefore given access to complex parliamentary processes and often changing political environments, where they spend large sums of money on capacity building which in the end, simply disempowers the staff and legislators of African parliaments.

 

One glaring proof of this is the lack of a single African-led, or African based parliamentary strengthening institution leading in Africa today. While international these institutions may be well intentioned, they often fail because of the certain assumption that anyone – no matter how poorly trained, ill equipped or inexperienced ‘expatriate’ – can be good for Africa. Often, quite conversely, the consequences are dire for the future of sustainable African institution building. The only exception here is the efforts being made by the East Africa Legislative Assembly (EALA: www.eala.org) to set up a parliamentary centre for East African legislators. The Africa Union and other sub-regional organisations (e.g. ECOWAS) can learn from this.

 

A new proactive approach required

In short, if there is recognition that legislatures are the driving forces of democracy and popular-based representation, then it is important to institutionalise these effectively. Africa needs to build Regional Parliamentary Centres funded by African governments, staffed by African experts, who of course can be supported by experts where necessary. The need to strengthen the Secretariats of  African  parliaments   to enable them deliver effective services to MPs and legislators, build sustainable, accountable, and transparent institutions to underpin democratic governance has never been greater. The lack of an African Parliamentary Institute mandated to train parliamentary staff, and supporting various committees of parliament is a serious ideological and institutional weakness.

 

The effectiveness of electoral politics means that voting ineffective MPs out and new ones in every five years is becoming the norm. This means that new MPs will need trained and competent staff to support them. Only a parliamentary institute linked to an institution of learning (e.g. University) can provide this sort of expertise on a long term, sustainable basis. It will produce professional parliamentary staff with a future interest in promoting excellence, and not mediocrity, and foster operational consistency in the work of legislatures, and be able to support new parliamentarians when the need arises.

 

Such an institution can not only enhance the work of parliaments, but also enable new (leaders) legislators to better understand their functions and how to exercise them for the good of the country. African parliaments need to move to the modern era through better management, effective financial systems and practices, and to use resources that are abundant in-country. Waiting for others – i.e. ‘internationals’ to provide the technical support, will lead to disappointment in the electoral process and weaken the parliamentary system as a whole. The people cannot wait.

 

 

© Zaya Yeebo/July 2008